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THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN LOUISIANA:
PRESUMPTIONS, BURDEN OF PROOF AND
APPELLATE REVIEW
Insanity is a highly complex concept which often poses serious
questions for the legal community. When incompetence is proven in
a civil action,' contracts may be declared null ' or curators may be
appointed to administer the affairs of the mentally deficient person.'
In a criminal proceeding, a finding of insanity either will stay the
proceedings indefinitely' or will result in exoneration of the defen-
dant from criminal culpability on the grounds that he could not
determine whether his conduct was right or wrong.' Significant con-
sequences for the criminal defendant attach in either result.
Historically, the application of insanity to various civil actions
has presented little difficulty; By contrast, the insanity defense in a
criminal matter is frequently the subject of controversy. Whether
the attention paid it is deserving has been questioned;' nevertheless,
insanity remains a real issue in the courts today and is likely to re-
tain some prominence in the criminal jurisprudence of the future.
This note will examine the aspects of the insanity defense most
closely related to the actual trial of the issue-the presumption of
sanity, the burden of proof of insanity, and appellate review.'
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 31 provides: "Persons of insane mind are those who do not
enjoy the exercise and use of reason, after they have arrived at the age at which they
ought, according to nature, to possess it, whether the defect results from nature or ac-
cident."
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1788 states: "The contract, entered into by a person of in-
sane mind, is void as to him for the want of that consent, which none but persons ill
possession of their mental faculties can give."
3. LA. Civ. CODE art. 32 provides: "Persons who, by reason of infirmities are in-
capable of managing their own affairs, have their persons andestates placed under the
direction of curators."
4. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 642 and 648 provide that the
proceedings shall be stayed when the issue of the defendant's sanity is raised and that
the stay will continue until the defendant has sufficient capacity to proceed. To possess
capacity, the defendant must be able to understand the proceedings against him and
assist in his defense, as provided by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 641.
5. In Louisiana, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is exempt from criminal
responsibility if at the time of the alleged offense he was incapable of distinguishing,
between right and wrong as a result of a mental disease or defect. CRIMINAL CODE: LA.
R.S. 14:14 (1950). This standard has been traced to M'Naughten's Case, 1 Car. & K. 130
(1843) and is commonly referred to as the M'Naughten Rule..
6. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
7. The subject of insanity most assuredly contains relevant issues not directly
related to the trial. Three such issues present substantial questions which merit some
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Presumption of Sanity
Presumptions, in a general sense, are devices which relieve one
of the parties in litigation from the necessity of having to prove a
particular fact.' One of the most common presumptions in the area
of criminal law is that of "sanity." In several states, including Loui-
siana, a defendant is presumed "sane and responsible for his
actions."' The presumption of sanity is rebuttable and can be
destroyed by evidence to the contrary. 10 But until evidence to the
contrary is produced, the presumption of sanity relieves the state of
attention, although a detailed discussion of them is beyond the scope of this note.
The first of these issues is the validity of the test for insanity presently in use in
Louisiana. The so-called M'Naughten Rule, CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:14 (1950), was
adopted by the legislature in 1942, but the courts recognized its historical application
in decisions reported before then. See, e.g., State v. Tapie, 173 La. 780, 138 So. 665
(1931). Other tests have been suggested to the court as being less "archaic," State v.
Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976), and more appropriate
to the current state of the medical art than the "right from wrong" test. The supreme
court has refused jurisprudentially to change the rule, deferring to the expressed will
of the legislature. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 369 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1979); State v.
Weber, 364 So. 2d 952 (La. 1978).
Another question, of continuing. interest in insanity defense cases, concerns the
determination of capacity to proceed. Great discretion is allowed the trial judge in
deciding whether the defendant "presently lacks the capacity to understand the pro-
ceedings against him or to assist in his defense." LA. CODE C0lM. P. art. 641. Capacity,
in this context, has been given a broad interpretation. For example, a defendant suffer-
ing from mental retardation and speech handicaps has been found incapable of pro-
ceeding. State v. Williams, 381 So. 2d 439 (La. 1980). Consistent with the wide discre-
tion vested in the trial judge, findings of capacity or incapacity are reversed on appeal
only when the supreme court finds manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Hamilton. 373
So. 2d 179 (La. 1979).
A third issue associated with insanity cases concerns the disposition of the criminal-
ly insane. The defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity does not obtain the
release normally associated with acquittal in a criminal trial. LA. CODE CalM. P. art.
654. The defendant may be committed to a private or state mental institution until
such time as he can be released without endangering himself or others.
The defendant who has been found capable of proceeding properly asserts the
defense of insanity when he pleads "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity."
LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 552. See also note 60, infra. The issue of his sanity becomes one
for the trier of fact, who must apply the M'Naughten test and, from all the evidence
presented, reach a factual determination as to whether the defendant could distinguish
right from wrong at the time the offense was committed. See State v. Sonnier, 379 So.
2d 1336 (La. 1979); State v. Daigle, 344 So. 2d 1380 (La. 1977). As the trial begins, the
defendant is presumed by law to be sane. See text at note 9, infra.
8. LA. R.S. 15:432 (1950).
9. 1&
10. l. Cf. LA. R.S. 15:433 (1950) (defining conclusive presumptions).
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any affirmative duty to prove that the defendant was in fact sane
and responsible for his actions.
Obviously, the sanity presumption is of tremendous benefit to
the prosecution since the sanity of the defendant may be as difficult
to prove as his insanity. The presumption has not been left un-
challenged, however, and its validity has been attacked on federal
due process grounds. Patterson v. New York"1 addressed the issue of
whether the affirmative defense of insanity violated the due process
clause.
Gordon Patterson was charged with the second degree murder
of his wife's alleged paramour. According to New York's statutory
scheme, Patterson could reduce the degree of his culpability - from
second degree murder to manslaughter-by proving that his con..
duct was the result of "extreme emotional disturbance."'2 In order
to reduce his culpability to a lesser degree of homicide this defen.
dant must overcome a presumption of sanity. In deciding that this
procedure did not violate the due process clause, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that states constitutionally could deter.
mine procedures for enforcing their laws, including making policy
decisions on the burdens of proof, unless the determination offended
some traditional notion of justice."
Within this framework, states can establish certain affirmative
defenses in criminal cases, create presumptions which operate in
favor of the state, and require the defendant to meet a certain
burden of proof in order to exonerate himself. If the traditional no-
tions of justice alluded to by the Court are not offended, the scheme
selected by the state does not violate the due process clause.
Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of
the offense is the kind of traditional notion of justice which con-
cerned the Court. This particular issue had been dealt with pre-
viously in In re Winship.' A trial court found a juvenile defendant
guilty by a preponderance of the evidence. This standard of proof in
a criminal proceeding was rejected by the Supreme Court. The
Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was mandated by
11. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney): "The fact that homicide was commit-
ted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating cir-
cumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be prov-
ed in any prosecution initiated under this subsection. . .."
13. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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the due process clause; to allow a state to convict a defendant by
any lesser burden of proof would violate due process and offend this
traditional notion of justice." The Court later determined that the
same result- violation of the defendant's due process guarantees-
is reached when a legislatively established presumption serves to
relieve the state of its burden of proof as to any essential element of
the crime charged.
Precisely this issue was presented in Mullaney v. Wilbur." The
state of Maine had established and utilized a presumption that all
homicides were committed with malice aforethought.'7 This pre-
sumption was rebuttable, however, for the defendant could reduce
his culpability by proving affirmatively that he acted in the heat of
passion on sudden provocation. Since malice aforethought was deter-
mined to be an essential element of the crime of murder, the pre-
sumption relieved the state of its burden to prove the guilt of the
defendant as to each element of the crime.'8 The United States
Supreme Court found that the presumption of malice violated due
process.
Louisiana has adopted a scheme similar to that sanctioned in
Patterson v. New York. A defendant may exonerate himself from
criminal responsibility upon proof of the affirmative defense of in-
sanity."' The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the applicabil-
ity of the Patterson20 analysis to Louisiana's insanity defense
statues and, in State v. Lee, adopted that holding:
[T]he United States Supreme Court had held that it was not an
unconstitutional denial of due process to place the burden on
[the] defendant to prove insanity as an affirmative defense ....
We consider Patterson v. New York ...to be the latest
definitive holding by the United States Supreme Court on the
presumption of sanity and thus is controlling .... We, therefore,
hold that it is not a denial of due process to provide in this
state's statutory law that insanity shall be an affirmative
defense .... 1
15. Id.
16. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17 § 2651 (repealed 1975). State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139
(Me. 1971.
18. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 701.
19. LA. CODE CilM. P. art. 652. See text at notes 25-27. infra.
20. 482 U.S. 197 (1977).
21. 395 So. 2d 700, 703 (La. 1981). See also State v. Willie, 360 So. 2d 813 (La.
1978).
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Sanity is not considered an essential element of the various criminal
offenses defined by the legislature; therefore, the presumption of
sanity does not suffer the same constitutional infirmities at issue in
Mullaney."
Some argue, however, that the mental state of the defendant is
critical to proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt since, at least
in theory, evidence of his legal sanity also may be relevant to the
question of intent. This argument perhaps has some merit if one is
willing to remove the distinction between intent and sanity.
However, neither the Louisiana Supreme Court nor the United
States Supreme Court has been so inclined."3 As long as Louisiana
continues to apply the presumption of sanity in a manner sanctioned
by Patterson-to provide a rebuttable presumption which does not
relieve the state of proving each essential element of the of-
fense-no violation of the defendant's due process rights occurs.2'
Burden of Proof
Under Louisiana law, as shown, the presumption that a person is
sane and responsible for his actions is rebuttable rather than con-
clusive; 8 in other words, the presumption of sanity can be overcome
by the defendant.' Allowing a defendant to produce evidence
designed to defeat the presumption of sanity (indeed, requiring him
to do so if he is to be relieved of culpability) makes insanity an af.
firmative defense. The defendant must offer positive proof of his in-
ability to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the of.
fense.Y
Although the defendant bears the burdens of both production
and persuasion, the burden of proof placed upon the defendant is
22. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The validity of Louisiana's presumption of sanity has been
attacked on similar grounds in the state courts and has passed constitutional muster.
See State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976). Both the
legislature and the courts recognize insanity as an affirmative defense, not an essential
element of the offenses contained in the criminal code. See LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 652;
State v. Lee, 395 So. 2d 700, discussed at note 21, supra.
23. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822
(La. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976). See note 32, infra.
24. See text at notes 14 & 15. supra.
25. LA. R.S. 16:432 (1950).
26. See notes 8, 9, & 10, supra.
27. LA. CODE CRIM. 1-. art. 652 provides that "[tlhe defendant has the burden of
establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of
the evidence."
28. Id
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not as stringent as that required of the state to convict. While the
state must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the Louisiana legislature has determined that a defendant must
prove his insanity only by a "preponderance of the evidence."" At
least one jurisdiction, Oregon, requires the defendant to prove in-
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." Challenges to Oregon's scheme
have, to date, been unsuccessful. In fact, the United States Supreme
Court in Leland v. Oregon8 found specifically that the states consti-
tutionally could hold the defendant to this strict burden of proof.2
If a state is permitted to compel proof of the defendant's insani-
ty beyond a reasonable doubt, a fortiori, a lesser burden of proof,
such as a preponderance of the evidence, is acceptable. Such a con-
clusion is not only a logical extension of these cases, but also is con-
sistent with the traditional notions of justice advanced by the Win-
ship doctrine. 3 Certainly, then, the Louisiana requirement that the
defendant prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
stands on solid constitutional ground.
Practical application of Louisiana's requirements of the presump-
tion of sanity and burden of proof to a criminal prosecution should
produce the following results: (1) When the state meets its burden of
29. Id
30. OR. REV. STAT. § 26-929.
31.' 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
32. Id. at 799-800. Closely analogous to Louisiana's rule is one in operation in
Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 401. The defendant in Delaware is held to proof of his
insanity by a preponderance of evidence. DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 304(a). In considering
the consitutional validity of placing this burden of proof on the defendant, the
Delaware Supreme Court, in Rivera v. Delaware, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. 1976), applied
Leland v. Oregon and found that the Mullaney decision (holding that a presumption
could not relieve the state of its burden of proving guilt as to each element of the
crime) was not applicable because the presumption of sanity and the burden of proof
on the defendant were not directed to an essential element of the offense. The distinc-
tion between intent and insanity was inherent in distinguishing these cases. The
United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Rivera for lack of a substantial
federal question. 429 U.S. 877 (1976). In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that sanity
cannot be considered separately from criminal intent. 429 U.S. at 879-80 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal). See text at notes 22-23, supra, and note 82. infra.
Requiring a defendant to overcome the presumption of sanity does not violate due
process because sanity has not been determined to be an essential element of an of-
fense (as was malice aforethought in the Maine statutes at issue in Mullaney). When
and if the distinction between intent and sanity is removed, the presumption of sanity
probably will be rendered invalid-at least for certain offenses such as specific intent
crimes.
33. See text at notes 14 & 15, supra.
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proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every
essential element of the offense and the defendant proves his insani-
ty by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant should be
found not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; 4 (2) When the
state meets its burden of proof and the defendant fails to prove his
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant should
be found guilty. 5
Louisiana's approach, however, is not universal; the federal
courts" and the laws of several other states ' take a drastically dif-
ferent view of the burden of proof. In these jurisdictions, once the
defendant has produced some evidence of his insanity (according to
whatever legal test of insanity used), the presumption of sanity is
overcome or rebutted and the prosecution then bears the burden of
proving the defendant's sanity beyond a resaonable doubt." Unlike
the federal procedure, the Louisiana prosecutor is not required to
prove the sanity of the defendant once some evidence of his insanity
is offered. The test is whether the trier of fact can determine from
all the evidence, whether lay or expert or offered in chief or on
rebuttal, that the defendant was capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong at the time of the offense.3 To date, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not required specific rebuttal evidence by the
state, but has been willing to look to the entire record in its review
34. The conditions for return of such a verdict are conjunctive. For this verdict to
be proper, the trier of fact must find the defendant "guilty" of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt, and then find him "legally insane" so as to excuse his conduct.
35. Louisiana has not provided for a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" when the
defendant's guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt yet there is some evidence of a
mental disease or defect, though not enough to prove legal insanity.
36. The requirement that the government prove the defendant's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt is rooted in the federal jurisprudence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(a) re-
quires the defendant to give notice that he intends to assert the insanity defense. This
rule serves the same purpose as Louisiana's "dual plea." See notes 38 & 54, infra.
37. A compilation of the laws in force regarding insanity in every state is con-
tained in G. MORRIS. THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
(1975).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 519 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1975), for a brief
discussion of the burdens of proof of sanity in a federal prosecution. The reference to
Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1967), 519 F.2d at 140-41 n.2, contains an
extensive citation to the federal jurisprudence enunciating this rule. In Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1977), Justice White noted that the trend in insanity
cases has been for the prosecution to "shoulder the burden of proving the sanity of the
accused." See also Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
39. See State v. Daigle, 344 So. 2d 1380 (La. 1977). See note 7. supra.
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of convictions in cases when insanity was raised as an affirmative
defense."0
Appellate Review
The defendant who prevails in his claim of insanity does not win
automatic release," but neither does he suffer all the consequences
of a conviction: a verdict of not guilty and not guilty by reason of in-
sanity results in a "qualified" acquittal from which the state is not
entitled to appeal.'" When the defendant is not successful in his
defense, he will likely seek appellate review, claiming that he was
erroneously found guilty.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Virginia" has expanded the appellate review to which a defendant is
entitled and has provided the allegedly insane defendant with a
method for having the validity of his conviction examined. The
Supreme Court in Jackson set out the proper approach for a court
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a convic-
tion is based. Since due process requires that a defendant be con-
victed only "upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,"" the
proper inquiry for a court is "whether, after reviewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt."'" This decision produced a drastic change in the
scope of appellate review of criminal convictions in Louisiana."
Constitutionally, the Louisiana Supreme Court's jurisdiction in a
criminal matter extends only to a review of law.'" For many years,
40. See, e.g. State v. Liner, 397 So. 2d 506, 509-11 (La. 1981). Ad hoc Justice Gar-
rison held that the court's previous decision in State v. Poree, 386 So. 2d 1331 (La.
1980), did not intend to require specific rebuttal by the state of evidence tending to
show the defendant's insanity.
41. LA. CODE CrM. P. art. 654.
42. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 816 & 912.
43. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
44. Id. at 315.
45. Id. at 319.
46. Insanity is not the only area of the criminal law receiving the expanded atten-
tion and protection of the supreme court. Appellate review of sentences has recently
become an interesting, if somewhat controversial, function of the court. See Note Ap-
pellate Review of Excessive Sentences in Non-Capital Cases, 42 LA. L. REV. 1080;
Note, Capital Sentencing Review under Supreme Court Rule 28, 42 LA. L. REV. 1100.
47. LA. CONST. art. V. § 5(c): "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution,
the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. In
criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law."
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the court held that attacks upon convictions based on claims of in-
sufficient evidence or evidence contrary to the verdict, did not pre-
sent questions of law." Instead, such pleadings were left to the
discretion of the trial judge when properly raised in a motion for a
new trial." Only when the defendant urged that his conviction was
based on "no evidence" did the supreme court undertake judicial
review as a matter of law." Jackson did away with the "no
evidence" standard because the test was not adequate to protect the
due process guarantees announced in In re Winship." Thus, in Loui-
siana sufficiency of evidence questions have become questions of law
which the state supreme court constitutionally is empowered to
review. After a short period of uncertainty over the proper applica-
tion of Jackson v. Virginia," its principles and test have been fully
implemented by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
An example of the court's initial indecision about the Jackson
rule's compatibility with the Louisiana Constitution is found in State
v. Poree.3 On November 7, 1977, Carlos Poree shot ten people, kill-
ing one of them. Among his victims were individuals Poree found at
random on the streets of New Orleans and in the offices of a stock
brokerage firm. Poree was indicted for first degree murder and
entered the dual pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of in-
sanity."' His first trial ended in a mistrial; upon re-trial, the fact that
Poree had indeed shot the victims was stipulated. The sole issue
before the jury was Poree's sanity at the time of the incident.
48. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 362 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978); State v. Arnold, 351 So. 2d
442 (La. 1977); State v. Hatter, 350 So. 2d 149 (La. 1977); State v. Finley, 341 So. 2d 381
(La. 1976).
49. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 851(1) permits the court to grant
a new trial when the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence. Absent a manifest
abuse of discretion, the supreme court will not disturb the trial court's denial of a mo-
tion for a new trial. State v. Turner, 365 So. 2d 1352 (La. 1978).
50. See State v. Main Motors, Inc., 383 So. 2d 327 (La. 1979); State v. Williams,
383 So. 2d 369 (La. 1980), stay granted, 387 So. 2d 598 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 971,
(1981).
51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See text at note 15, supra. The Jackson Court said "[that
the ... 'no evidence rule' is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the
constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent." 443 U.S. at 320.
52. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
53. 386 So. 2d 1331, 1336 (La. 1980) (on rehearing). Coincidentally, this case marks
the beginning of the application of Jackson's "rational trier of fact" standard to insani.
ty defense cases.
54. Id at 1331. The plea was "dual" because it asserted both the innocence of the
defendant and his claim that he was legally insane at the time of the offense. See note
7, supra.
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Poree benefitted from the testimony of two psychiatrists who
opined that he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong
at the time of the incident.' Poree's estranged wife and his father-
in-law, both victims of the shootings, testified to drastic changes in
his behavior during the weeks prior to the incident.
The state's evidence on the issue of sanity consisted of
testimony that Poree shot only men in the stock brokerage office,
apparently deliberately avoiding serious injury to the women; that
he offered no resistance to the arresting officers; and that he im-
mediately told the police he would not make any statements until he
had consulted with an attorney. Although one of the psychiatric ex-
perts explained that these actions were not necessarily inconsistent
with his opinion that Poree was legally insane, the jury found the
defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
Two questions faced the supreme court at the outset of its
review of Poree's conviction: "(1) Does the constitutional prohibition
against review of facts in a criminal case preclude action by the
court in this (and similar) cases?, and (2) what standard should be ap-
plied in testing the validity of the conviction?""
The threshold question was whether a review of the sufficiency
of the evidence presents a matter of law or of fact. The court held
that "due process requires that a defendant in this posture (assert-
ing an insanity defense) also must have access to review when he
claims that he was found guilty of an offense despite the fact that
the evidence of his insanity was uncontroverted."5 As a matter of
law, the defendant was denied due process and was entitled to a
new trial. No clear standard was announced, but the court apparent-
ly felt that the defendant successfully proved his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. VirginiaN was found to
compel judicial review of sufficiency of evidence claims-at least in
cases when the defendant pleads insanity. 9
55. Id. at 1332-33. According to these expert witnesses, Poree satisfied the
M'Naughten Rule. Id. at 1338.
56. Id. at 1338, 1339.
57. Id. at 1334.
58. 443 U.S. 713 (1979). Shortly after this decision was rendered, the standard of
review enunciated was applied to an insanity defense case. Moore v. Duckworth, 433
U.S. 713 (1979). See note 85, infra.
59. 386 So. 2d at 1334-35.
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On the rehearing of Poree the supreme court reversed itself."
The application of Jackson and its effect of compelling review of in-
sanity cases on due process grounds was rejected. The majority
reverted to many prior holdings that claims of sufficiency of
evidence were questions of fact which the court could not constitu-
tionally review; 1 only contentions that there is "no evidence" upon
which to base a conviction posed questions of law.62 Since the court
found that "the record contained some evidence which indicated a
capability of distinguishing between right and wrong,""° the judg-
ment of the trial court was sustained.
Following Poree, the court was faced with other attacks upon
the "no evidence" rule. Sufficiency of evidence questions were
raised along with contentions that Jackson should be invoked to pro-
vide review of such questions in order to preserve the due process
guarantees of the defendant.6" But the court did not readily accept
these contentions; instead, the court chose to apply two standards.-
Jackson's "rational trier of fact" standard and the "no evidence"
rule. Applications of these standards may be found in three post-
Poree cases raising the sufficiency issue." Chief Justice Dixon
criticized the court's reluctance to adopt the Jackson rule, later
referring to the three cases as evidence of the court's period of
"vacillation" regarding Jackson." By 1980, the court discarded the
"no evidence" standard and fully embraced the "rational trier of
fact" rule. 7 Within a few months, the opportunity to apply the test
to an insanity case arose.
60. I& at 1340 (La. 1980) (on rehearing). The narrow majority for reversal of the
conviction shifted to an equally narrow majority for affirmance.
61. The court relied upon the constitutional prohibition against review of facts in
criminal matters, citing State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340 (La. 1976), as authority for
the proper scope of review in insanity cases. 386 So. 2d at 1337.
62. This is the traditional application of the "no evidence" rule which was rejected
in the court's original Poree decision. 386 So. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (La. 1979).
63. Id. at 1339.
64. See State v. Custard, 384 So. 2d 428 (La. 1980); State v. Boutte, 384 So. 2d 773
(La. 1980); State v. Mathews, 375 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1979).
65. See cases cited in note 64, supra. None of these decisions involved the insanity
of the defendant. In one case, State v. Mathews, the court found reversible error-,
holding that there was a total lack of evidence (the "no evidence" rule) from which a
rational trier of fact could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
every essential element of the offense (the Jackson rule).
66. See State v. Roy, 395 So. 2d 664, 667 (La. 1981).
67. See, e.g., State v. Harveston, 389 So. 2d 63 (La. 1980); State v. Guillot, 389 So.
2d 68 (La. 1980); State v. Morgan, 389 So. 2d 364 (La. 1980). These decisions were
rendered on October 6, 1980.
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The facts presented to the court for review in State v. Roy"
were strikingly similar to those in Poree. William Glen Roy shot
four people in Winnfield, Louisiana, within a short period of time.
Willie Sean Davis died as a result of a wound inflicted by Roy.
Following an indictment for first degree murder, Roy pleaded not
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. He was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Roy did not deny
shooting Davis, but instead argued that he had proved his insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence, and, therefore, the jury's ver-
dict was contrary to the law and evidence."
The evidence of Roy's insanity consisted exclusively of
testimony from three physicians-two psychiatrists and the Winn
Parish coroner. Each doctor testified that the defendant could not
distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the offense. 0
The state argued that such actions as fleeing from the scene and
peaceful submission to arrest were evidence of the defendant's sani-
ty.t' Neither Roy nor the state produced any other evidence of Roy's
mental condition.
In reviewing Roy's conviction, the court held that the Jackson
"rational trier of fact" test was the proper standard of review in suf-
ficiency of evidence cases." In addition, the court continued, this
test is the proper one to apply in those cases in which the defendant
pleads insanity, an affirmative defense, and alleges insufficient
evidence to convict: "Due process now appears to require extension
of the [Jackson] test to situations where the defendant pleads the af-
firmative defense of insanity, and claims the record evidence does
not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' Roy's
conviction was reversed because the court found that the defendant
had met his burden of proof. Applying Jackson to these facts, "a ra-
tionale [sic] fact finder, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, could not have concluded that the
defendant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was insane at the time of the offense."'" The case was
remanded for "proceedings not inconsistent with ... [the] opinion."''
68. 395 So. 2d 664 (La. 1981).
69. Id at 669.
70. Id. at 668.
71. Id at 669.
72. Id
73. Id at 667.
74. Id. at 669 (on application for rehearing).
75. Id. Since the appeal in Roy was taken from the trial court's denial of the mo-
tion to grant a new trial, the court reversed the decision of the -trial judge on this
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. In later decisions, 6 the supreme court again reviewed the suffi-
ciency of the defendant's insanity evidence but rejected in each case
his claims that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. This line of
decisions results in a grant of appellate review to all defendants
who are convicted despite their pleas of insanity; the issue of suffi-
ciency of evidence poses a question of law reviewable by the Loui-
siana Supreme Court.
Summary and Conclusion
The presumption in Louisiana law that every man is sane and
responsible for his actions has withstood constitutional attack at the
federal and state levels. The basis for its continued validity relies oil
one of two propositions: (1) criminal intent and mental condition at
the time of the offense are not necessarily the same; or (2) essential
elements of an offense can be established by a state, as can affir-
mative defenses, but traditional notions of justice cannot be
violated. State decisions seem to rely on the first proposition,7 while
federal cases appear to be based on the second. 8
Because sanity is not the same as intent, 9 it does not become an
essential element of the offense as defined by the Criminal Code
and, consequently, the state bears no compulsory burden of proof ol
that issue. As long as the distinction between the two concepts can
be drawn validly, the presumption of sanity will continue to operate
in favor of the state without violating the due process guarantees of
the defendant. Similarly, the state can adopt a scheme allowing a
issue, and, presumably, a new trial is in order. Perhaps the posture of the second trial
will be similar to that in Poree, and the only issue for the trier of fact will be the sani-
ty of the accused. See text at notes 53-55, supra, and note 83, infra.
76. See State v. Liner, 397 So. 2d 506 (La. 1981); State v. Price, 403 So. 2d 660
(La. 1981); State v. Claibon, 395 So. 2d 770 (La. 1981); State v. Hathorn, 395 So. 2d 783
(La. 1981).
77. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822. 826 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
954 (1976).
78. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See text at notes 11-14, supre,
and note 79, infra.
79. See State v. Abercrombie, 875 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
935 (1980). The facts in Abererombie were such that a rational trier of fact could have
found that the defendant acted with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
The issue of the defendant's sanity thus clearly could be separated from the acts tend-
ing to show his specific intent. See also, H. FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979). (The Jackson test was not applied to
the question of insanity, although the court did apply Jackson to test the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which Abercombie's conviction was based).
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defendant to produce evidence in an attempt to exonerate himself
from criminal culpability, and the procedure will be valid as long as
it does not offend a traditional notion of justice. Presuming that a
man is sane and requiring him to prove otherwise is not constitu-
tionally offensive.
Once the validity of the presumption is affirmed, the choice of
the burden of proof to be placed upon the defendant to overcome
such a presumption is largely a policy issue. Choices of burdens of
proof range from a burden on the defendant to prove his insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt to the same burden on the prosecution to
prove the defendant's sanity. Louisiana's choice is virtually the me-
dian. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires the trier of
fact to weigh all that is presented and to find in favor of the party
producing the greater weight of the evidence."
The initial question for the supreme court in its review of a con-
viction when insanity is raised as a defense directly concerns the
burden of proof. If the defendant alleges that he met his burden of
proof, but was convicted nonetheless, the court must examine the
record and determine from all the evidence, lay and expert, whether
a rational trier of fact, in viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, could conclude that the defendant
failed to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.' If
the court finds that the trier of fact could reach this conclusion, the
defendant should stand convicted;"2 when the evidence supports the
defendant's position, the case should be remanded for further pro-
ceedings.S'
The application of the Jackson standard has transformed allega-
80. The Louisiana definition of "preponderance of evidence" is that level of proof
where the evidence as a whole shows that an event sought to be proved is more prob-
able than not. This standard also is used in deciding civil cases. See, e.g., Walker v.
Saint Paul Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976). There is no reason to
differentiate between criminal and civil matters for purposes of this definition.
81. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
82. This result presupposes, of course, that the state met its burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as to every essential element of the offense. See note 35,
aupra, and note 83, infra.
83. The nature of what these proceedings should be is not clear. If the court con-
cludes that the elements of the offense were properly proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, but that a rational trier of fact could not have found the defendant sane, it will
then have to determine whether the case should be retried de novo, or whether only
the issue of the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense should be tried again.
Language in State v. Byrd, 385 So. 2d 248, 252 (La. 1980), suggests that the latter pro-
cedure might be permitted.
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tions of insufficient evidence from questions of fact to questions of
law for purposes of appellate review under the Louisiana Constitu-
tion.' Appellate review of insanity cases by this standard provides a
convicted defendant with protection not before available. The "no
evidence" rule required affirming a conviction when the record con-
tained some evidence to support such a conclusion; the "rational
trier of fact" test is broader than the "no evidence" rule and,
although the Jackson decision (and the state court decisions follow-
ing it) seems to require application of the standard to test the suffi-
ciency of the evidence as to essential elements of the offense, Loui-
siana has chosen to apply the analysis to proof of the affirmative
defense of insanity."8 Since the sanity of the -defendant is not an
essential element of any offense in Louisiana, the safeguards re-
quired by Jackson certainly have been expanded. Serious problems
in the application of insanity to the criminal law remain,"' but the
status of the presumption of sanity, the burden of proof, and the
nature of appellate review of insanity cases in Louisiana appear
firmly resolved.
Harry J. Philips, Jr.
84. The holding in Jackson makes sufficiency of evidence questions due process
issues. These are matters of law which the supreme court constitutionally can review.
85. See note 58, aupra. The decision in Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713 (1979),
applied Jackson in a context different from that encountered in Louisiana. Indiana re-
quired the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane.
Sanity was an essential element of the offense, not an affirmative defense. Therefore,
the Jackson test would be applicable to this issue under Indiana, but not Louisiana,
law.
86. Among these problems are: whether insanity should be allowed as a defense
at all; what standard should be used for determining legal insanity that fits the needs
of both the medical and legal communities and whether such compatibility is even
desirable; who can best determine the issue of sanity-judge or jury; and whether the
so-called "synthetic sanity" (drug induced) which renders a defendant capable of stand-
ing trial is valid. New theories of insanity such as the "Vietnam Stress Syndrome"
must be addressed by the courts. Sensitive problems involving competence to abandon
appeals in death penalty cases must receive the courts' attention, often on extremely
short notice with a minimum *of expert assistance. Insanity is an issue in which com-
plexity is as unavoidable as the emotion which surrounds it. As a result, it seems cer-
tain that answers to these questions will be neither easy nor universally popular.
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